For permanent partial disabilities .the: net payments :restored! between.-one-fourth" and ,one-half, of the wagp-loss., Id. at 13. Thus it will be noted that -in -the 'employee )Cases the proportion of wage, loss restored, in, cases involving rion-fatal injuries, was slightly higher in cases of serious loss than in less serious cases. See also note 121 infra.-.,
For.-summaries of some of the 'findings of the two 'studies, see-,Cdfstvet, The Uncompensated Accident and lt s C6nsequences, 3 LAxw &, CONTEmP' ,,PRon., 466' (1936) ; Pollack, Worknen'r Coinpenation'for Railroad Work JnjurieS and Diseases, 36 ' . , _, 7.' The Columbia Study showed that in the uninsuted defendant cases some payment ,was made in 27% of the temporary disability cases, in 2 1o of such permanent, disability cases, and in only '17% of such cases involving fatalities: COL ,BIA STDtmY, 75,-Payments covered economic'loss up to time of settlement ;in. only .11% oftheiminsured defendant cases involving temporary, disability and in only about 5% of such casts involving, ser!i s loss. Id. at 203-04.-See also id. ati261-66,-269-73,. . ... ' ' . ' 
--
8. See note 6 itpra;-note 12 .nfra..
-. ' ' 9. See COLUMBIA STUDY 205, ; RALRoAD STUDY 146-58. . .
-10. The Columbia Study found that in the great majority of cases studiedthe family %was supported, by one or more -wage earners receiving small wages, and that "'most of the adults who were injured were -themselves -earners, three-fourths of whom earned less than $40 a week." COLUMBIA STUDY, 55. See also id. at 66, 218-20;' RAMROADI STUDY [67] [68] Corstvet, supra note 6, 11. See RAiLRoAD-STUDY 47; Corstvet, supra .note, 6,. at 468; Pollack, .-tpra note 6, at242-45.
: ' 12, See CoiUmBIA STUDY . ' The Railroad Study-made -an even more complete tabulation of the, disparity between payments and losses. See' RAILROAD -STUDY 13.' It contains many suggestive tables., Id. ati 101, 107, 115, 119, 129,_ 133 . The illuminating text accompanying these tables points out that while the-adjusted average wage restoration in permanent total disability cases is 607, "this average is little, more than the midpoint of a wide range, which shows that in ,11 cases out of 83, payment covers less (6) Even those who got large payments were not able to preserve these sums so as to assure themselves against continuing economic losses from the accidents.' 3 The Columbia Study concluded that a system was needed which would distribute payments more promptly and more equitably according to losses, and which would provide for meeting future needs by periodic payments. It proposed a scheme of compensation for automobile accidents along the lines of workmen's compensation acts.
14 In spite of the grave defects of our present system as a method of compensating accident victims, only one jurisdiction in the Anglo-American world, the province of Saskatchewan, Canada, has adopted a system of compensation in any field besides that of industrial accidents. 1 The tendency among European countries has been towards strict liability in motor vehicle cases, but none of them has substituted modified scheduled losses for tort damages.' 0 The continued failure of this proposal to secure wider adoption prompts several inquiries. Is the need still there; or have the glaring defects been partly cured under the present system? If they have not, are there defects in the proposed system as grave as, or graver than, those we now have, so that the proposal deserves to fail on the merits? If a compensation system is desirable on the merits, how can we account for the failure? It is the purpose of this article to consider these questions.
The studies we are considering dealt with events that happened some time ago: the Columbia Study nearly three decades, the Railroad Study nearly than a quarter of the loss, in 25 cases from one-quarter to one-half, in 28 cases from one-half to three-quarters, and in the remaining 19 cases three-quarters or more." Id. at 120. See also Pollack, supra note 6, at 248 (range in permanent total disability cases from zero to $50,000).
13. See RAILROAD SrUDY 15, 16, 166-76; Pollack, supra note 6, at 250-51. The Columbia Study did not investigate this aspect of the problem.
14. See COLUMBIA STUDY 215-17; cf. id. at 237-45. The Railroad Study does not contain an explicit recommendation of compensation legislation for railroad workers. However, one member of the Railroad Retirement Board remonstrated because "in large part, the report consists of argument, express or implied, in support of a system of workmen's compensation for railroad employees." RAILROAD STUDY 219. This member believed that the report therefore went beyond the authority conferred by the Senate resolution authorizing the Board to make the investigation and report. In reply the chairman of the Board pointed to the letter from the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee transmitting the resolution to the Board and said that in view of its language "and of the actual findings of the study which, without advocating, show the need for a workmen's compensation system in the railroad industry, it would have been perfectly The application of legal rules has changed measurably so that both the requirement of fault and the strength of defendants' defenses have been diluted.
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The role of the jury has expanded. 2 1 A greater proportion of automobiles are insured. 2 2 There has been a great increase in hospital and medical insurance ;23
and other forms of social insurance have also had an effect.
24
Has the impact of all these things changed the situation fundamentally? The awards to successful litigants have certainly been increased by more than the rise in the cost of living, and much larger amounts are now paid in settlement of the dramatic, outstanding cases. But how have accident victims fared by and large? Has there been prompter and more equitable distribution of payments according to losses? Or do we still have feast and famine-jackpot justice, but with larger prizes for the winners?
17. Smith, supra note 1, at 794.
18. The National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys tabulates in its publication, NACCA Law Journal, verdicts or awards exceeding $50,000. See, e.g., 20 NACCA L.J. 388-404 (1957) , listing 53 verdicts and awards of $100,000 or more, mostly for the period from March to November 1957. The highest award to a single plaintiff was a jury verdict in Chicago for $750,000, "believed to be the largest award in a single case in the history of the nation." Id. at 398. This case was finally settled for $600,000. 21 NACCA L.J. 407 (1958) . Of the 53 awards for $100,000 or over, only 8 of them were made in New York State.
19. For a brief statement of the history and purposes of the National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys, see Horovitz, Editorial, 10 NACCA L.J. 17 (1952); Lambert, Editorial, 18 NACCA L.J. 25 (1956 
").
24 This bas been particularly true in railroad work accidents. Pollack, Vupra note 6, at 263. But today even a person injured in an automobile accident may receive workmen's compensation payments, social security benefits, and, in a very few states, disability benefits.
One of the foremost needs in the study of torts during this third quarter of our century is a comprehensive factual examination, of the economic consequences of automobile accidents which will: (1) bring up to datethe findings made in the Columbia Study; (2) find out what claimants have done with the largeamounts paid them for injuries or death involving substantial future economicloss, and the extent to which that disposition has enabled, claimants to -meet future, losses; and (3) determine whether' periodic payments (e.g., -under workmen's compensation) have in fact been more effective than lump sum'payments to meet future losses.
2 5 ---It is entirely possible not only that compensation is still inequitably distributed and is ,onthe whole too little and too late, but also that,'eveni the large awards are too often dissipated by improvidence and unwise investment so that they are less effective to meet future, needs ' Economie-Fnancial Consequences' of 'PersoMl Injuries Sustained; in 1953 Philadelphia Anib Aceiddnts, 7 EcoN. & Bus. BULL. No. 3 (March 1955 . Since this study' is not widely available; some of its findings will ' be noted here: -' I -tme 'statui of earner victims, nonfatal cases. 27.6% carried less than $50 a week, 32.6% betwe&n,$51 and $70, 31.3% between 71 and $100. Id. at 27.
"Personal injuries resulting :from automobile accidents result in out-of-pocket loss, a large partof which is never recovered.' Id.'at,90. See also id. at85.' I I '...,, While-theie: was 'some form of hbspital'ihsurance in about 45%o of the cases studied, "the incidence 'of surgical 'coverages, increases with income, and cash disability policies were reported, only among the upper income groups." Id.-at. 30. Most of what was paid on. accouht of 'injuries came from third-party' liability insurance, id. at 85-86,, 90, but uninsured automobiles caused substantially more than their proportionate share of accidents, id, 'at 32-,33. ' I I I "Settlement' amounts' have' littl& equity as between groups, injuries, and circumstances, varying most with litigation." Id. at 90. While extent of liability and amount of 'expenses influence the amounts, paid 'in settlements, these "show more variation, in terms of amount' Iith' other personal factors, especially community, status and business position. -The most important variable, however, is the retention of an attorney by the claimant." Id.-at 87,, "The attitudes of insurers 'calling fori 'buying' claims for as little as-possible and the deteriorations of the application of the strict legal principles of liability to settling such cases has given rise to [the fact that the retention of an attorney substantially improves the chance 'of collecting as well as the amount paid in settlement] . compensation continue to claim that payments made under proposed plans would far exceed those made at present. 28 If that is true, it is the very best evidence of the present system's inadequacy. Everyone knows the modest schedules of payments under compensation acts. Everyone knows too of the very large verdicts awarded in some cases under the present system, verdicts many times the maximum awards under any compensation scheme. If, in spite of these high awards, the total amount paid for claims today is far lower than it would be under a compensation system, then the amount paid on most claims must indeed be very far below that which would be paid under compensation-and even compensation would restore only a fraction of the actual economic loss. Pending further studies, then, it is reasonable to assume that the over-all inadequacy, the inequity, and the delays of the common law system are stiU with us. A compensation system which would assure to all persons injured by motor accidents substantial and expeditious compensation for their economic loss and which would ptovide periodic payments for future needs would go far to cure these defects. The question, then, becomes whether an attempt to provide such a system would bring about even greater evils. This broad question has many facets andicalls for an evaluation of some of the objections raised against the proposal. In making this evaluation it is important always to distinguish between the characteristics which such a scheme must have in order to eliminate the evils aimed at and other characteristics which any given proposal may have but which ate not indispensable for the main purpose.
At the threshold is an objection which divides men philosophically. Some oppose compensation because it provides for liability without fault and for recovery even by one who has himself been negligent. They argue that those who want protection against injuries resulting from their own fault or from nobody's fault should insure, and that the innocent should not be The studies conducted in Philadelphia and New Haven are briefly described in Marx, "Motorisin," Not "Pedestrianism": Compensation for Automobile 's Victims, 42 A.B.A.J. 421, 423-24 (1956) .
One of the foremost students of the problem has recently concluded that "as a means of giving adequate protection against the machines of the highway, negligence law has run its course. Something better must be found." GREEN, TRAFFIc VIcTIms-ToRT LAW AND IN SURANCE 82 (1958 29 This goes to the heart of the problem, for compensation proposals frankly reject ordinary negligence as the test, though they may take extreme fault into account. 30 This rejection of negligence in turn rests on conclusions that fault-in the sense of clear ethical shortcoming -does not play a very significant part in present-day accidents, 3 ' that modern industrial enterprises and activities like motoring will continue to take a more or less inevitable toll of life and limb, and that the accident loss should be reckoned as a cost of the activity which causes it and distributed broadly among those who benefit from the activity. Opposition to the view just stated may come from a deep belief in laissez faire and in the kind of individualism that saw freedom of contract in the employment relationships of the early industrial revolution. Such an attitude would equally condemn workmen's compensation as socialistic-as indeed it did. Few would take so extreme a position today, 3 2 but it cannot be said that the insurance principle should be applied to all accidents, or to all automobile accidents, simply because it is widely accepted for work injuries. The question is not so much whether the principle of social insurance is valid as where the line should be drawn in its application. Proponents of automobile compensation point to workmen's compensation, which is widely conceded to be sound, 33 as far as it goes, and to the similarities between the problems of automobile and industrial accidents. Opponents who are willing to accept compensation for work injuries seek to distinguish automobile accidents by arguing that in the latter there is no 's Victims, 42 A.B.A.J. 421, 426, 477-78 (1956) .
[Vol. 59 "sphere of endeavor" which causes the losses and no business enterprise through which the automobile owners can pass on their costs as can an employer.
3 r In automobile cases, they claim, the relationship between the parties does not warrant special treatment and does not assure the curbing of abuses. The automobile often injures a child or a housewife whose economic loss cannot be measured as can a worker's.
8 6 And finally, they argue that there is no reason to single out automobile accidents when there are so many other sources of accidental injury, such as the home.
A comparison of the findings in the Columbia Study and the Railroad Study shows striking similarities in the economic consequences of accidents and in the inadequacy and inequality of compensation under common law systems in the fields of automobile accidents and work injuries. The social need for adequate and equitably distributed compensation is much the same; the differences do not seem weighty. Of course, automobile owners are not engaged in a joint venture for profit, but they do represent the class of people who benefit directly from motoring and who-like the ultimate consumers of the employer's products-may fairly be asked to contribute to the losses which their common activity of motoring causes. Thus there is a relationship between the parties sufficient to warrant strict liability, but it is a relationship that probably will not supply the same automatic check on malingering and other abuses as does the employment relationship.
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However, this does not mean that such abuses would be greater in automobile cases under compensation than they are at present. The problem of compensation for those not gainfully employed is not serious.
3 8 And the objection to singling out the automobile approaches the trivial. The automobile accident has singled itself out, as its frequency and its economic consequences plainly show. It is perfectly true that automobile accident compensation is not a complete answer to all our woes. A good case can be made for a much broader type of social insurance, perhaps covering all disabilities from accident or illness. But those who raise the present objection would be the last to espouse anything like that. Their complaint is levelled against any extension of social insurance, and it is garbed in transparent hypocrisy when directed to the incompleteness of any proposed step.
I do not mean by this to belittle the resistance to steps which move away from individualism and laissez faire. We have witnessed a great resurgence of this resistance as an emotional and political force since the war. This in itself may help to account for the failure of compensation to receive wider acceptance during that time, though it does not account for that failure during the years of depression and the New Deal. What I do mean is that this resistance is no longer an across-the-board intellectual attitude, except among a few visionary die-hards. 30 Automobile compensation administered by private enterprise fits well within patterns now long familiar on the American scene.
Less extreme than an insistence on keeping the whole individualistic fabric of fault, and more widespread, is the feeling that no one should recover for an injury resulting from his own gross fault. The literature in opposition to compensation has many a reference to the drunken driver and even to the "drunken pedestrian running into the rear of a slowly moving car." 40 It may be that this reflects the prevailing attitude of people generally. If it does, then this should be reflected in a compensation scheme by providing that a claimant's gross fault will bar or diminish his award. It may be noted in passing that loyalty to the fault principle may be inspired not only by a conservative philosophy but also by a desire to justify the very large award as one against the "wrongdoer." As may be expected, those who seek this justification are quite willing to see the requirement of fault diluted to the point where it no longer has any significant ethical content and is seldom a bar to liability.
41
Some opponents see in compensation an invitation to carelessness, 42 but such a fear is surely groundless. The stricter liability will if anything increase the incentive to exercise care, and insurance against liability will not engender irresponsibility under a compensation system any more than it does at present. 43 There also is no more reason to suppose that individuals will be readier to risk injury for certain but modest awards than they are for the chance under the present system of the very large awards which are so widely publicized. Workmen's compensation was followed by a very material decrease in industrial accidents, 4 and while automobile compensation [Vol. 59 may be less effective as a promoter of safety, there is no basis for thinking that it would increase accidents. 45 The next set of objections to compensation deal with expense and adequacy. Spokesmen for defendants say that such a scheme would be intolerably expensive; those representing plaintiffs say that it would afford pitifully small awards. 46 These contentions are interrelated and raise interesting and fundamental questions. So far as expense goes, that would depend on the amounts paid in compensation. It would be possible to devise schedules at such levels that the sum of compensation payments would not exceed the total amounts now paid for tort claims. The Railroad Retirement Board, for instance, found that railroads paid some 12 million dollars in claims and judgments under the FELA for injuries (including fatal injuries) incurred during selected months over a three-year period. It also found that the value of the past and estimated future wage loss resulting from these injuries was 24 million dollars. 47 Actual payments varied from nothing to a great deal more than the actual wage loss in individual cases. The same money could have met about one-half of the wage loss in every case.
48
The objection on the score of expense cannot stand alone. Whatever we can afford to pay could be distributed according to compensation, rather than common law, principles. The expense objection necessarily implies that the sum now spent on loss payments would not provide for adequate compensation.
Plaintiffs' men complain that a compensation system would yield only a pittance. To this several things should be said: (1) Under the present system the majority of persons get even less of a pittance, although a few get much more. (2) Periodic compensation for loss of future wages gives greater assurance that this loss will be replaced than does the same sum in lump payment. (3) However justifiable some large awards may be under the rules of liability and damages now in force (and many of them undoubtedly are), the great disparity in payments to those having similar economic losses cannot be justified; and the system which produces these disparities is inequitable. 47. RAILROAD STUDY 6. The total estimated wage loss was $30,500,000. The figure given in the text represented an adjustment for the present value of future earnings. The cost to claimants of acquiring the $12,000,000 was $1,000,000. 48. This is something of an oversimplification. In death cases, for instance, the guide should be not wage loss, but probable contributions to dependents.
49. The notion that liability should be based on fault would of course justify some disparity in payments between persons having similar economic losses. But many factors besides fault enter into the disparities which actually exist today. Indeed fault is not Perhaps society can afford to pay more to its accident victims than it is now paying, and perhaps it should. This, of course, will always be a matter of debate and struggle. But however much or little society can afford or should be made to pay, the first claim against that sum should be in favor of meeting a substantial part of the serious economic loss 0 of all accident victims. If anything remains, other considerations such as fault (with respect to liability) and pain and suffering (with respect to damages) may be considered in determining how the remainder should be distributed.
In this, it seems to me, lies the answer to the question whether the compensation remedy should be made exclusive. Saskatchewan does not make compensation exclusive, and the cost there of liability insurance is exceedingly reasonable.
5 1 Actuaries estimated that the cost of a similar scheme in North Dakota would be well within the bounds of reason. 5 2 England no longer limits the worker's recovery for work injuries to compensation.5 3 Some continental countries provide for strict liability in automobile cases without limitation on the amount of recovery. 54 In none of these jurisdictions, however, do the amounts awarded even remotely approach the sums awarded in the urban centers of this country for comparable injuries. Liability insurance rates here are already the highest in the world even though strict liability has not been adopted. Whether our unparalleled and unprecedented material prosperity would warrant putting our existing expensive system on top of a even the principal determinant. Thus, the Railroad Retirement Board found a principal reason in the nonlegal "pressures and counterpressures that it is possible to exercise in the course of bargaining." RAROAD STUDY 120. See also id. at 48. The study conducted in Philadelphia found that although liability and actual loss played a part, "there is rarely a clean-cut decision [on the basis of liability], but rather that it may be a matter of geographic location; who the persons involved are; circumstances of the insured and victim; the lawyer and doctor involved in the case and the like." Temple University Bureau of Economic and Business Research, supra note 27, at 73. See also id. at 87, 91; Corstvet, sutpra note 6, at 468-69 (stressing the nonlegal bargaining pressures).
50. Since the serious personal injury and fatal cases cause the social problem, property damage claims might well be excluded from the system. See 51. The Saskatchewan compulsory policy protects the insured against liabilitv under the compensation plan and in addition against (1) liability under the common law up to a limit of $10,000 for one person or $20,000 for more than one person inijlred or killed in one accident, and 'S5,000 for property damage in one accident (with $?V0 deductible if the damage is caiised in Saskatchewan) ; and (2) loss from collision, hail, theft, flool, wind, storm, and falling aircraft (with a $200 deductible clause). The cost of this insurance is graduated according to the wheelbase and age of the car. In 1950 the premium for a 1956 Chevrolet was only $27.00. SASKATCHEWAN [Vol. 59 compensation scheme may be open to some doubt, 55 although a combined system would eliminate any duplication of benefits and might lead to a revitalization of the fault requirement.
Other objections are also related to this matter of expense. It has been argued that a compensation system is more expensive to administer (aside from any question of payments to claimants), and that it will invite more malingering and fraud than does the present system. If these charges are well founded they would constitute drawbacks to extending compensation.
The charge of expense is based on a study comparing the cost of administering workmen's compensation claims in Illinois with the cost of administering claims against Illinois railroads under the FELA. 56 It was found that the latter system "costs less per dollar of benefit conferred." 57 The principal difference is in legal expense.
58 While this is disappointingly high under compensation, the apparently good record under employers' liability may reflect an unhealthy state of affairs. The Railroad Retirement Board found that employees were generally afraid of being fired if they brought suit, or even retained lawyers to pursue their claims, against the railroad, 59 which acts as a self-insurer in these cases. This means that much of FELA is being administered by the employers on a paternalistic basis and largely on their own terms. Self-insurance is rare under workmen's compensation, and the workmen's compensation board is generally accessible with an actively protective role to play. While the extent of litigation in workmen's compensation is deplorable, it must not be overlooked that much of it serves as a protection to the worker which is absent under the other system. As to malingering and fraud, they thrive under the present system where rewards for success are occasionally dramatically high.
60 There seems to be little reason to suppose that they will be increased by a system under which payments are limited. It is true that compensation would remove the need to fabricate facts to show liability, but the malingering problem is concerned with the extent of injuries and disability, and the present requirement of fault -diluted as it has become-affords no guaranty of trustworthiness in the testimony about injuries. Perhaps the delays and other difficulties of the 55. An Australian writer would reject any residual tort action because (1) it would siphon off money that should go towards financing compensation to pay "prizes for those who would play the common law action," and (2) the present system is primitive and clumsy as a deterrent against carelessness. Parsons, Death and Injury on tile Roads, 3 U.W. Ausm. ANN. L. REv. 201, 273-74 (1955 491 (1936) . present system discourage some false claims, but we know that they also discourage many meritorious ones and weaken the bargaining position of honest claimants. It is a harsh thing to deny or discourage meritorious claims for fear of opening the floodgates to litigation and fraud. The law has often done so for a time, but when the rule has finally been liberalized to accommodate merit, the flood has seldom come.
It is also true that continuing periodic payments present their own problems as a source of malingering and of protracting disability in more subtle psychological ways that do not involve conscious dishonesty. But techniques for combatting these problems exist, 0 1 and at any rate the difficulties seem less serious than those of a system rigidly tied to the lump sum payment.
Some opponents of change-largely from among the ranks of plaintiffs' lawyers-see in a compensation scheme a threat to the institution of the jury trial.
6 2 A fair appraisal of this objection requires careful analysis.
In the first place, the objection would have little weight with those who find the jury trial wanting. However, many Americans, including the present writer, believe the jury trial to be of value in accident cases. 03 We must therefore proceed further with our analysis. A belief in the jury system does not mean a belief that juries are being given the right issues to try or the right guides by which to try them. Juries played a valuable role in administering the law of seditious libel in sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth century England, but that does not mean that the law of seditious libel was good. History has condemned that law, yet on the whole praised the role of the jury under it. 6 4 .Indeed, a great strength of the jury is its ability to inject common sense, or contemporary popular prejudice, into the administration of an archaic or a harsh or an unwise rule of law. But surely that is no reason for keeping the rule. A belief in the jury system has no logical tendency to justify either the present rules of liability or the present rules of damages in accident cases. It would be entirely feasible to have the disputed issues of fact which would arise under a compensation system tried by juries. [Vol. 59 administer that they would present few seriously litigated issues and therefore little need for juries.
6 6 The legislatures also felt that the delays and expense incident to full judicial trials-and especially to jury trials-were among the evils of the older system to be avoided under the new one. 67 Some may have had a third reason: perhaps they expected that administrators would become expert in problems of work injuries and could solve these problems better than a lay jury.
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These reasons are all debatable. Experience has shown that workmen's compensation has given rise to much litigation teeming with the kinds of questions that could appropriately be left to a jury."" Doubt has been cast on the relative efficiency and inexpensiveness of workmen's compensation administration. And there will always be disagreement as to whether an expert or a lay tribunal will solve questions of injury or disability in a way more satisfactory to society.
If any jurisdiction reaches the point of adopting a compensation scheme, it will have to decide whether to employ the jury trial. But this problem is severable from the threshold question: what should be the bases of liability and of damages?
Some opponents of compensation for automobile accidents stress the shortcomings of workmen's compensation.
7
" The chief complaint is the inadequacy of payments under existing state laws. The matter of over-all adequacy has already been treated. The present article is a plea neither for greater nor for smaller payments, but rather for a more equitable distribution of whatever we do pay. Some of these complaints, however, are directed against faulty methods of distribution within particular compensation systems. These features need not and should not be carried over to other systems. Thus, arbitrary maximum limits on the number of payments or on sums payable for medical expenses tend to discriminate against cases where the need is greatest. If penury must be practiced, let it fall rather on cases where need and hardship are least, by reducing or even eliminating payments on small claims. Again, a failure to adjust continuing payments to meet changes in 108-46 (1949) ; GREEN, op. cit. upra note 27, at 97. 69. Some of them involve resolution of conflicts in the testimony. Examples are questions about the fact of injury and whether, if it happened at all, it happened on the job, the extent of injury or disability, and the fact and extent of dependency in fatal cases. Other questions quite appropriate for the jury's function involve an evaluation of legal consequences within limits set by law. Thus the phrases "arising out of and in the course of employment" or "of the use or operation of a motor vehicle" present many doubtful and close questions (even where facts are admitted) which could be resolved by a jury just as well as are questions regarding "scope of employment" in vicarious liability cases today. See 2 HARPER & JAMEs, TORTS § 26.8 (1956 the cost of living is a defect in all existing compensation schemes which should be repaired in spite of the difficulties such adjustment would entail.
Other complaints are directed at the administrative side of compensation. In work injuries, it has led to a disappointing amount of litigation. Much of this turns on the deceptively simple phrase: "injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment."
' 7 1 It must not be forgotten that most of this litigation represents a constant extension of the borderlines of compensation.
7 2 Most of the cases litigated on this score would not have raised a question of the employers' liability at common law. Virtually this whole field represents pure gain from the point of view of those who would extend compensation, although the gain may have cost more in terms of friction than had been hoped. The other great sources of compensation litigation are questions regarding the extent of injury and disability. It may be assumed that a certain amount of this is inseparable from any adversary system wherein there is some effort by society to control the bargaining process. Litigation is a cost of this effort, and is probably worthwhile to curb the current evils of the bargaining.
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Workmen's compensation has its drawbacks, more in some state systems than in others. Automobile compensation would also have drawbacks, though it need not borrow all of those to be found in the weakest existing industrial accident systems. No one with any objectivity claims that the proposal would be a "heaven on earth." 74 But its detractors, I think, miss the woods for the trees. All compensation systems proceed on a basically more equitable principle of distributing payments for accident losses than does the common law. All of them provide for continuing payments to meet future needs, and most of them yield much prompter payments.
Why, then, has compensation failed of adoption in the automobile field while it has been adopted so widely in the field of industrial accidents? Those who do not like compensation will say that it is because most people disagree with my conclusion that it is desirable. I think this may be partly true but I doubt that most people have thought the problem through. The strongest force in the picture is, I suspect, the force of inertia. For generations we have thought of the civil recovery as coming out of a defendant's own pocket, and we have felt that it was unfair to impose this individualized liability unless the defendant was at fault. Yet this way of thinking no longer dominates the stage entirely. One of our most perceptive trial judges has said that "the 
73.
What happens where the process of bargaining goes unchecked is the principal subject of the Railroad Study.
74. Opponents of compensation, however, sometimes suggest that its proponents make such a claim. Tyack, supra note 46.
[Vol. 59 community no longer accepts as completely valid legal principles basing liability on fault." 75 Sixty years ago Holmes wrote that "the inclination of a very large part of the community is to make certain classes of society insure the safety of those with whom they deal."1 7 6 We know about automobile liability insurance, and we are affected by the "contagious principle of workmen's compensation."
77 And when as jurors we are called on to play an actual part in the working of the system, these factors have a very great influence on us-we tend to make the present system work in the actually litigated cases something like the way compensation would. Today's judges do something of the same thing when they liberalize tort rules and enlarge the jury's sphere. This in turn probably has some tendency to stifle the dissatisfaction we might have with the present system if we saw its workings in the large. 78 Moreover, there is nothing to publicize and dramatize its hardships. Workmen's Compensation, 9 NACCA L.J. 20 (1952) .
78. This raises the question whether one should applaud or deplore common law developments which ameliorate the harshness of the present system. It has always seemed to me that steps in what I think is the right direction should be welcomed for the benefits they confer directly and that it is pretty speculative how much such steps will retard the eventual accomplishment of more thoroughgoing reform. At any rate, the question is academic. Any system we have will change and will respond to pressures and social need whether or not we want it to do so; and while specific changes may be checked or impeded, they will not be avoided by frank appeals to keep the present system bad in order to hasten its end. Those who would work against reforms within the common law framework for this reason are, therefore, driven either to futility or to disin- 81. The resistance is not unanimous, but it is enough to deprive the movement of effective labor support. See Pollack, supra note 6, at 261 n.77. The typical attitude of counsel for railroad unions and plaintiffs may be seen in Richter & Forer, supra note 20.
82. The debates about compensation have been no more free from ad hominein arguments than human disputes usually are. Each side points out the selfish interests that motivate the other and charges his adversary with insincerity. Both sides try to
